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JAMES L. MEDOFF AND KATHARINE G. ABRAHAM
This study provides direct evidence concerning the relationship between experi-
ence and performance among managerial and professional employees doing similar
work in two major U. S. corporations. The facts presented indicate that while, within
grade levels, there is a strong positive association between experience and relative
earnings, there is either no association or a negative association between experience
and relative rated performance. If we are correct that the performance ratings given
to managerial and professional employees in any grade level adequately reflect those
employees' relative productivity in the year of assessment, the results imply that the
human capital on-the-job training model cannot explain a substantial part of the ob-
served return to labor market experience.
There is abundant evidence that earnings grow with labor market
experience over most of a normal worklife. Since the advent of human
capital theory,1 the vast majority of labor economists have accepted,
or at least not openly challenged, this theory's contention that the
upward sloping segment of the experience-earnings profile reflects
on-the-job training, which causes the relevant underlying experi-
ence-productivity profile to slope upwards However, there are other
potential explanations of the relationship between experience and
earnings in which productivity growth plays a very minor role. For
instance, Mincer [1974, p. 80] recognizes the possibility that the
positive association between experience and earnings might only
"reflect the prevalence of institutional arrangements such as seniority
provisions in employment practices." He then makes the observation
that sets the stage for this study: "Such practices, however, do not
contradict the productivity-augmenting hypothesis, unless it can be
shown that growth of earnings under seniority provisions is largely
independent of productivity growth." 2
Thus, the human capital interpretation of the experience-earn-
ings profile is distinguished from other interpretations by the pre-
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diction that earnings growth reflects productivity growth.3 Despite
the dominance of human capital theory over labor economics during
the past fifteen years, there exists no evidence that corresponding
pieces of the experience-earnings and experience-productivity profiles
have slopes of the same sign. There is a simple explanation of why this
important proposition has not been addressed empirically: it is very
difficult to measure an individual worker's productivity in an ad-
vanced industrial society. However, if the hypothesis is to be tested,
this measurement problem must be addressed.
This study has as its basis the assumption that job performance
ratings done by imm€diate supervisors are valid indicators of the
relative current productivity of white male managerial and profes-
sional employees engaged in comparable work (i.e., that an employee
rated ahead of X percent of his peers is more productive than X
percent). Under this assumption, which will be supported at length
below, it is possible to compare the relative earnings and relative
productivity of employees in similar jobs who have different amounts
of experience. The evidence to be presented, drawn from the personnel
records of two major U. S. corporations, has as its most important
implication that, while greater experience moves white male mana-
gerial and professional employees toward the upper tail of the earnings
distribution for their grade levels, it does not move them toward the
upper tail of the relevant performance distribution. Thus, the primary
finding to be discussed appears to be at odds with what would be ex-
pected, given the human capital interpretation of the experience-
earnings profile.
Section I describes the two company personnel files used in the
research and discusses how they were transformed for statistical
analysis. Section II demonstrates that, while there is a positive asso-
ciation within grade levels between relative earnings and experience,
there is not a positive association between relative performance and
experience. Potential criticisms of the way in which we have come to
our main conclusion, that a substantial fraction of experience-earnings
differentials cannot be explained by experience-productivity differ-
entials, are considered in Section III. Factors that might possibly
explain the finding are briefly considered in Section IV.
3. In the human capital model, productivity growth does not necessarily produce
earnings growth; if a worker's productivity were enhanced by firm-specific on-the-job
training financed solely by the firm, the earnings profile would be flat. However, if
growth in earnings is observed, according to the model, either general or specific training
(financed partially by the worker) and thus growth in productivity must have oc-
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I. THE COMPANY PERSONNEL FILES
Company personnel departments are a rich and little-explored
source of economic microdata. Most major U. S. corporations collect
and computerize extensive information on the demographic charac-
teristics, earnings, and job performance of their employees. Hence,
they represent a primary potential supplier of evidence concerning
the relationship between experience-earnings and experience-pro-
ductivity profiles.
The Company A and Company B Personnel Data Files
Two large corporations in the U. S. manufacturing sector, here-
after called Company A and Company B, have provided computerized
personnel records for virtually all the members of their exempt
workforces.4 The Company A file contains information computerized
(and, thus, roughly current) through March 15, 1977; it has only a
limited amount of historical data and only persons active during at
least one pay period since mid-1975 are included on the file. The
Company B records contain information entered through July 1, 1977,
including a complete log of all personnel actions since 1971 for persons
active on or after September 1, 1976, and an abbreviated personnel
action log for persons active on or after January 1, 1974.
All samples drawn from the Company A data set were limited
to employees in jobs categorized as managerial or professional under
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's job classification
scheme. The samples extracted from the B file include only employees
in those grade levels into which the Company classifies its managerial
and professional jobs. To be included in an analysis, an employee in
a selected position or grade level had to be white, male, "active," full
time, regular, and domestically based as of the appropriate date(s).
Both the A file and the B file contain data on each employee's
education, birth date, service date, and current physical work location.
Both files also record each individual's most recent performance rating
and current salary. In addition, the Company B file contains usable
information on each individual's performance evaluation history and
salary history.
Time with the company was calculated for each individual by
reference to his service date. The schooling information in each file
4. Both companies deletedinformationon the name, address, and social security
number of eachworker toinsure employee anonymity. Neither company provided the
personnel records for a very small number of their top executives, as the records con-
tained sufficiently detailed information that these individuals might have been iden-
tifiable even without name, address, or social security number.706 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
was used to categorize individuals by highest level of educational at-
tainment: less than high school, high school diploma, bachelor's de-
gree, master's or law degree,5 or doctorate. A pre-company experience
variable was computed to equal age minus schooling minus company
service minus five. For this purpose, it was assumed that those with
less than a high school education had spent 10 years in school, high
school graduates 13 years, college graduates 16 years, master's degree
holders and lawyers 18 years, and Ph.D.'s 21 years. Dummy variables
were created for the Company A and Company B physical work lo-
cations which place each site in one of four regions: Northeast, North
Central, South, or West.
Performance Ratings at Company A and Company B
One piece of information that distinguishes a typical company
personnel file from other sources of economic microdata is the as-
sessment of how well each individual performs his or her job. At both
Company A and Company B, supervisors review each managerial and
professional employee's performance roughly once a year. Company
A's "Employee Assessment" form instructs the reviewer to:
List the six most important job duties or Areas of Accountability in decreasing
order of importance. Next establish standards of performance or Expected Results
for each area. Be sure to set your standards and/or objectives so that successful ac-
complishment falls into the 2 (Good) column. These standards should be discussed
with the employee at the beginning of the assessment period. At the end of the as-
sessment period, indicate the extent to which the results were obtained. .
Thereviewer is then instructed to rate the subordinate's overall
performance in his or her current job as: outstanding, good, accept-
able, not acceptable, or too new to rate. In addition, the reviewer is
asked to provide a separate assessment of each employee's potential
for advancement, rating each employee as follows: promotable with
no apparent limitations, promotable beyond next level, promotable
one higher level, not promotable, or too new to rate. After a feedback
session, the completed rating form is signed by both the rater and the
ratee, and then given to the rater's superior for comments and a
signature.
Company B's "Supervisor's Guide for Performance Review and
Development Planning," in use from 1970 through the end of 1976,
offered the following suggestions to the reviewer:
The performance review of employees demands care and attention and should
be carried on without distractions or interruptions. Before you begin a performance
5. The Company A education coding system does not include a separate law degree
category. There are nine lawyers included with those holding master's degrees in the
basic Company B regression sample.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 707
review,refresh your knowledge of the content of the employee's position description.
If only a generalized description is available, take time to think through the specific
components of the job. It is very important that you analyze how the employee is per-
forming in each of his areas of major responsibility. The more concrete your thoughts
are, the more helpful your suggestions will be. The review should cover a sufficiently
long span so that a pattern of performance can be observed. Except for extremely un-
usual cases, a period of 4 to 6 months experience with the employee should be sufficient
to enable you to make objective judgments about him and thus complete a performance
review.
Considering the employee's performance over an extended period will aid greatly
in minimizing the influence of recent incidents and will help you to be objective and
fair minded. Each factor being reviewed should be considered separately and be based
on fact rather than opinion.
Reviews should be based on the employee's performance in his present position
and only for the period since his last review. Since previous ratings should not be allowed
to influence the current reviews, many managers prefer to make their evaluations
without having the past records at hand.
The supervisor began the review by listing up to four of his sub-
ordinate's strengths ("He is particularly good at:"), and indicating
whether "each is (essential, important, supplementary) to his job."
The supervisor then indicated up to four areas where there was room
for improvement ("He could use help in:") and the relative importance
of each to the subordinate's job. Finally, the reviewer was told:
Now that you have completed your analysis of his strengths and opportunities
for improvement, check the box opposite the paragraph that most nearly describes
your evaluation of his overall performance:
O EXCELLENT: Consistently exceeds expected performance in accomplishing
objectives and position requirements. oSUPERIOR:Exceeds expectations and demonstrates high level performance
in accomplishing objectives and position requirements.
O GOOD: Accomplishes objectives and position requirements as originally
anticipated and in a manner resulting in expected performance.
O SATISFACTORY: Acceptable performance of position requirements with
indication of ability for improvement.
J MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE: Probationary performance level for employees
in same position for more than twelve months, requiring consultation with
the employee and a specified plan for improvement within a designated period
of time.
oUNACCEPTABLE:Unsatisfactory. Does not perform at an acceptable level
of accomplishment.
The rating chosen then became the basis of the rater's recommen-
dation for a salary action (which was reviewed by the appropriate
group of the rater's superiors). No ratings in the bottom two categories
were observed.
At the beginning of 1977, the Company B performance/salary
review process was altered. One relevant change was in the number
and description of the overall performance rating categories. Under708 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
the new program there are only four rating categories. Even though
only the first four rating categories were ever used under the old
program, the different descriptions under the old and new plans led
to different rating distributions in the two regimes. For this reason,
the performance ratings done before January 1, 1977, are not com-
parable to those done after that date.
As both companies' evaluation procedures indicate, a perfor-
mance rating should be based on how well an individual, in the year
of evaluation, is carrying out the responsibilities of his or her job.
Thus, a performance rating should reflect an employee's current level
of performance relative to the level of performance deemed normal
for someone in his or her position. It follows that the ratings of two
employees are comparable only if the workers are in similar jobs.
For compensation purposes, companies assess the relative im-
portance and difficulty of their myriad positions and group them in
light of these assessments into grade levels. For both companies under
analysis, this grading is based on a position description filled out (and
kept current) by the supervisor of the job (with the concurrence of
higher level supervisors, when necessary). The "Exempt Position
Description" form in Company B (which is quite typical) obtains
information about the following: the basic purpose of the job, the
duties and responsibilities of the position, and the job holder's rela-
tionship to others within or outside the organization. In addition, the
form elicits:
Functional Scope Data: A listing of the functional statistics commonly used in
the industry and/or profession to indicate scope and size of responsibility, e.g.: a) Sales
Volume, b) Total Employment, c) Operating Budget, d) Department Payroll, e) Total
Assets, f) Number Supervised—direct and indirect, g) Cost of Rentals, h) Purchasing
Volume, i) Other.
and
Position specifications: The normal knowledge or training required; the normal
minimum experience and the required personal characteristics such as level of maturity,
tactfulness, judgment, creativity, etc. All of the foregoing should be regarded as being
necessary for an average employee in order to attain a satisfactory level of proficiency
in the job.
The jobs held by sample members from Company A fall into
nineteen grade levels; those held by sample members from B fall into
twelve. In light of the way in which jobs are classified into grade levels,
it is assumed that positions within a grade level are of equal impor-
tance and difficulty.6 Thus, within a grade level it seems most rea-
6. Interviews with a number of Company B supervisors lent strong support to this
assumption.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 709
TABLEI
CHARACTERISTICS OF WHITE MALE MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
SAMPLES USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Mean
(standard deviation)
Company A Company B
(N =4,788) (N =2,841)
Highest level of educational attainment:
Less than high school diploma (yes =1) 0.050 0.026
High school diploma (yes =1) 0.449 0.466
Bachelor's degree (yes =1) 0.444 0.401
Master's or law degree (yes =1) 0.049 0.082


















(1) Not acceptable/satisfactory (yesi)b 0.002 0.012
(2) Acceptable/good (yes =i)' 0.053 0.366
(3) Good/superior (yes =1)hi 0.743 0.584
(4) Outstanding/excellent (yes =1)' 0.202 0.038
a. These figures are based on torrent dollar salaries as of March 15. 1977. for ('ompanv A and asof July 1,
1975. or ('ompany B.
I). I'erformance rattng I is worst, and performance rating 4 is best. The Company A performance category
description precedes the slash and the Company B description follows the slash.
sonableto assume that a higher performance rating implies higher
productivity.
A Comparison of the Two Companies' Work forces
Examination of Table I reveals great similarity in the demo-
graphic characteristics of the basic Company A and Company B re-
gression samples.7 In both companies, nearly 50 percent of the sample
7. The basic regression samples consist of all white males who were "active"
full-time regular domestically based managerial and professional employees as of March
15, 1977, at Company A and as of July 1, 1976, at Company B for whom valid infor-
mation on education, birth date, service date, physical work location, most recent
performance rating, current salary, and current grade level was available. The re-
quirements that education, birth date, service date, and physical work location be
available resulted in the exclusion of 22 Company A employees and 791 Company B
employees. At the time we obtained the Company B data, the firm was in the process
of adding educational codes to its computerized personnel system. Almost all of the
Company B exclusions resulted from not yet complete (and apparently randomly
missing) educational information.710 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
did not graduate from college. The Company B sample contains a
somewhat higher proportion of people with advanced degrees; this
is consistent with the organization's involvement in research and
development activities. On average, Company A's employees have
somewhat less pre-company experience than Company B's employees
(6.8 years versus 9.5 years), but somewhat longer company service
(16.8 years versus 14.9 years). The average annual salary at Company
B exceeds the average annual salary at Company A by nearly $2,900.8
There is a larger concentration of people in the top performance
categories at Company A than at Company B; this is most likely at-
tributable to the differences in the sets of rating instructions given
the supervisors at the two companies.
II. RELATIVE EARNINGS AND RELATIVE PERFORMANCE
This section offers evidence for three propositions:
1. Managerial and professional employees with more than average
pre-company experience and company service have higher than av-
erage salaries;
2. About 40 percent of the earnings differentials associated with
pre-company experience and with company service occur within grade
levels;
3. These within-grade-level earnings differentials cannot be ex-
plained by within-grade-level differentials in job performance. The
third proposition, which is the study's major finding, is demonstrated
both by a test in which performance rating dummies are entered into
a within-grade-level human capital earnings function and by esti-
mating and contrasting multinomial logit earnings and performance
category equations.
Earnings Function Results
The regression results presented in Table II allow us to compare
the earnings of groups of managerial and professional employees
stratified by both educational attainment and labor market experi-
ence. These findings are based on a standard semi-log earnings
function:
ln(y) =x9 +,
8.This figure was produced by inflating the Company B mean salary to March
1977 dollars using the Consumer Price Index to make it comparable to the Company
A mean salary, then taking the difference between the two mean salaries.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 711
where y equals annual salary rate, x is a vector whose elements capture
highest level of educational attainment, pre-company experience,
company service, and region, $isa vector of parameters to be esti-
mated, and is an equation error. As stated above, the pre-company
experience variable was constructed to equal age minus years assumed
spent in school by those with different degrees minus company service
minus five. Thus, in the presence of dummy variables capturing
highest degree received and a company service variable, differences
in pre-company experience will be indistinguishable from differences
in age.
Equations (1) and (4) indicate that, with pre-company experience
and company service held constant, individuals with advanced degrees
receive substantially higher salaries than individuals with less edu-
cation. The proportional reward to education within the two com-
panies studied appears quite similar, except that, holding experience
constant, college graduates are relatively better off at Company B;
the percentage earnings differential between those with a high school
diploma but not a bachelor's degree and college graduates with
comparable labor market experience is only 13 percent at Company
A as compared with 22 percent at Company B.
In both companies, controlling for educational attainment and
company service, there is a positive association between salary and
pre-company experience, and, controlling for schooling and pre-
company experience, a positive association between salary and
company service, which weakens with length of service but does not
vanish within the set of feasible differences in years of service.
Regressions (2) and (5) include grade-level dummies, and hence
provide information on within-grade-level earnings differentials.
These within-grade-level salary differentials are central to this study,
since performance ratings are conditional on the importance and
difficulty of an employee's position, and thus, on his grade level. This
implies that the performance ratings can at most explain the fraction
of a total earnings differential that occurs within grade levels.
As can be seen by comparing regressions (1) and (4) with re-
gressions (2) and (5), relatively little of the return to educational at-
tainment takes the form of higher within-grade-level earnings. Con-
trolling for pre-company experience and company tenure, systematic
within-grade-level earnings differences account for an average of only
12 percent in Company A and 10 percent in Company B of the total
earnings differential between those with a bachelor's degree and less
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of the total earnings differential between advanced degree holders
and those with only a bachelor's degree.9 Thus, college graduates earn
more than less educated workers almost entirely because they are
assigned to jobs in grade levels with higher mean earnings; the same
is somewhat less true of advanced degree holders as compared with
those with only a bachelor's degree.
In contrast, a large fraction of the return to pre-company expe-
rience and to company service reflects higher within-grade-level
earnings. At the appropriate sample mean for pre-company experi-
ence, 48 percent (in A) and 34 percent (in B) of the salary differential
associated with an additional year of this construct occurs within
grade levels. At the appropriate mean for company service, 44 percent
(in A) and 38 percent (in B) of the return to an additional year of
tenure occurs within grade levels. Thus, a substantial fraction of the
observed relationship between experience and earnings cannot be
explained by between-grade-level differences in mean salaries.
Why do workers with more education, more pre-company ex-
perience, and more company service have higher within-grade-level
earnings? One possible explanation would be that such workers have
acquired valuable skills during their years in school and in the labor
force, and as a result their productivity exceeds that of less educated
and less experienced workers in the same grade level. If this expla-
nation were valid, it would be expected that the introduction of per-
formance rating dummies into the ln(earnings) equations which have
grade-level controls would move the estimated coefficients of the
schooling, pre-company experience, and company tenure variables
toward zero. However, comparison of equations (2) and (5) with
equations (3) and (6) reveals that, although higher rated performance
is associated with significantly and substantially higher earnings,
introduction of the rating dummies has virtually no effect on the
relevant education and experience coefficients. Thus, performance
does not appear to be a mediating factor in the within-grade-level
positive relationship between either education or labor force expe-
rience and earnings. In other words, within groups of similar jobs,
despite the positive correlation between "human capital" and earn-
ings, there does not appear to be a positive correlation between
"human capital" and performance.
9. These figures are weighted averages. The weights for the firstset are the pro-
portions of those with less than a high school education and of high school graduates
in the less educated worker group; the weights for the second set are the proportions
of master's or law degree holders and of doctorates in the advanced degree group.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 715
Multinomial Logit Results
The multinomial logit models estimated for Table III offer an-
other way of looking at the earnings-performance nexus.10 In con-
structing the models, employees rated either "not acceptable" or
"acceptable" (in A) or "satisfactory" or "good" (in B) were categorized
as below-average performers for their grade level.11 Employees rated
"good" (in A) or "superior" (in B) were categorized as average per-
formers for their grade level. Employees rated "outstanding" (in A)
or "excellent" (in B) were categorized as above-average performers
for their grade level. Next, employees were categorized as having ei-
ther a below-average salary, an average salary, or an above-average
salary for their grade level. Salary categories were assigned on the basis
of each individual's percentile ranking in the relevant within-grade-
level salary distribution in such a way as to make the salary and the
performance categories comparable. Suppose, for example, that X1
percent of the individuals in grade level k were in the lowest perfor-
mance category, X2 percent were in the middle performance category,
and X3 percent were in the top performance category. An individual
in the bottom X1 percent of the grade level k salary distribution would
be assigned to the lowest salary category, an individual in the next X2
percent of the grade level k salary distribution to the middle salary
category, and an individual in the top X3 percent of the grade level
k salary distribution to the top salary category. Assuming that per-
formance ratings accurately reflect relative productivity, if more
productive workers were always paid more than less productive
workers, the assignment of individuals to salary categories would be
identical with the assignment of individuals to performance
categories.12
A maximum likelihood multinomial logit procedure was used to
estimate the effects of education, pre-company experience, and
10. Nerlove and Press 119731 discuss the multinomial logit model.
11. The small number of employees with the lowest observed performance rating,
"not acceptable" in Company A and "satisfactory" in Company B, made itseemad-
visable to combine the bottom two categories at each company to create a "below-
average" category.
12. The samples used for constructing the performance and salary categories
consisted of all "active" full-time regular domestically based white male managerial
and professional employees in each grade level for whom both a valid salary and a valid
performance rating were available. There were fewer people in the multinomial logit
samples due to the more stringent data availability requirements that had to be sat-
isfied. Thus, unless relative rated performance in the larger sample is perfectly related
to relative salary, our procedure need not (and does not) result in the number of logit
sample members in each salary category equaling the number of logit sample members
in the corresponding performance category.716 QUARTERLYJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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company service on the probability of an individual's being in each
of the salary categories and in each of the performance categories. The
multinomial logit model specifies the probability that an individual
is in category i to be of the form, e/￿_1 e'i, i =1,2,3, where xis
a vector of individual characteristics containing education dummies,
pre-company experience and company service variables, region
dummies, and grade level dummies, and the flu, 132,andflarevectors
of parameters. The coefficients presented in Table lilA are estimates
of the elements in vectors equal to $— f3, i=2,3.
If the higher within-grade-level earnings of those with more ed-
ucation, more pre-company experience, and more company service
were a reflection solely of the higher relative productivity of such
workers, one would expect the estimated coefficients in salary category
equations (1) and (3) to equal the estimated coefficients in perfor-
mance category equations (2) and (4). In fact, the estimated coeffi-
cients in the salary category equations are markedly different from
the estimated coefficients in the performance category equations. At
both Company A and Company B, those with less than a college ed-
ucation appear to have a much lower probability of being in one of the
top two salary categories than do those whose highest degree is a
bachelor's degree, but an equal or higher probability of being in one
of the top two performance categories. Those with advanced degrees,
on the other hand, appear to have a substantially higher probability
of being in one of the highest two earnings categories than do those
whose final degree was a bachelor's degree, without having a sub-
stantially higher probability at A and actually having a substantially
lower probability at B of being in one of the top two performance
categories.
At both Company A and Company B, pre-company experience
appears to decrease an individual's chances of being in the bottom
salary category, while increasing his chances of being in the bottom
performance category. At both companies, additional company service
has a significant and strongly positive effect on the probability that
an employee will be in one of the top two salary categories; at Com-
pany A the incremental effect of an additional year of service falls as
the amount of accrued seniority gets larger but does not vanish within
the feasible set of values for the variable. While the initial years of
service at Company A have a small but significant positive effect on
the probability of an individual being in the middle performance
category rather than in either the top or the bottom performance
category, this effect vanishes in under seventeen years (i.e., within
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B, length of tenure has no significant effect on a person's performance
category.
The point estimates (and approximate standard errors) pre-
sented in Table TuB were calculated using the estimated coefficients
from the multinomial logit models (and the variance-covariance
matrix of the parameter estimates). In both Company A and Company
B, the point estimates of the multinomial logit coefficients imply that
for the mean sample member an additional year of either pre-com-
pany experience or company service would do the following: (1) sub-
stantially reduce the probability of being in the below-average salary
category, increase the probability of being in the average salary cat-
egory, and increase by a larger percentage the probability of being in
the above-average salary category; and (2) increase the probability
of being in the below-average performance category, reduce or leave
unaffected the probability of being in the average performance cat-
egory, and reduce by a larger percentage the probability of being in
the above-average performance category. Thus, the multinomial logit
coefficient estimates strongly suggest that while pre-company expe-
rience and company service tend to move individuals with average
measured characteristics toward the top of the relevant within-
grade-level salary distribution, they tend to move them toward the
bottom of the relevant within-grade-level performance distribution.
It seems clear that at least among the samples of employees at Com-
pany A and Company B under analysis, higher relative productivity
cannot be offered as a satisfactory explanation of the higher relative
within-grade-level salaries associated with additional labor force
experience.13
III. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS
Our finding that a substantial fraction of the experience-earnings
differential among managerial and professional employees in major
U. S. corporations cannot be explained by an experience-performance
differential is inconsistent with the explanation of the experience-
earnings profile associated with human capital theory. Thus, it is likely
that this paradigm's adherents will argue that the test which we have
conducted was ill-conceived. In this section we attempt to anticipate
and address potential criticisms of our approach. We have grouped
these criticisms according to whether they question our econometric
13. It is perhaps worth commenting that, although the data used in this study
only permit us to conclude that at Companies A and B the within-grade-level portion
of the experience-earnings differential cannot be explained by an experience-perfor-
mance differential, there is no direct evidence on the extent to which the cross-grade-
level portion of the experience-earnings differential at Companies A and B reflects
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methods or our key assumption that within similar jobs, rated per-
formance is monotonically related to productivity.'4
Econometric Issues
As stated above, the key piece of information used in our analysis
is the performance rating given to each employee. Since this assess-
ment seems to be conditional on an employee's job assignment and,
hence, his grade level, our analysis has focused on whether the
within-grade-level portion of the experience-earnings differential (a
substantial part of the total experience-earnings differential) could
be explained by a within-grade-level experience-performance
differential.
A critic might correctly point out that by looking within grade
levels at a given firm, we most likely induce a negative partial corre-
lation between experience and unobserved ability. Even if in the whole
relevant sample, experience and ability have a zero correlation, within
a given grade level, more experienced employees most likely are less
able than less experienced employees, since otherwise they probably
would have been promoted to jobs in higher grade levels. A critic might
also point out that performance ratings are almost surely error-ridden
proxies for relative within-grade-level productivity.
With regard to our earnings function results, it can be shown
formally that neither the existence of a negative within-grade-level
correlation between experience and ability nor random error in the
performance ratings we have used to capture relative productivity
can explain the failure of the estimated within-grade-level return to
labor market experience to move toward zero when performance
rating controls are introduced.'5
14. Another potential criticism might be that our work is flawed because we look
at cross-sectional data rather than at changes over time in the relative earnings and
relative performance of members of a cohort. This argument is dealt with in Medoff
and Abraham [forthcoming]; longitudinal data from another large company yield the
result that, for white male managers or professionals remaining in a grade level, relative
earnings rise and relative performance falls with the passage of time.
15. For a sample of people in a grade level, let earnings be a function solely of
productivity:
(1) lnY1C+(1, i>O,
and productivity be a function of both experience and ability:
(2) C =a2X+ v:A + ,(2, a,> 0, cov(X,A) <0.
Suppose that we have a variable which captures productivity with error for those in
the given grade level:
(3) PC+.
Assume that these three equations accurately describe the relevant relationships and
that ,, and1areuncorrelated with each other, with X, and with A. Under these
conditions, if In Y is first regressed on X alone and then regressed on both X and P,
the expected value of the experience coefficient falls toward zero when P is added. This
model is laid out more fully in Medoff and Abraham [forthcoming].722 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The conclusions that can be drawn from our multinomial logit
results also appear to be unaffected. It is true that if there is a negative
within-grade-level correlation between experience and ability, the
estimated effect of experience on performance will be biased down-
ward. It should not be forgotten, however, that the estimated effect
of experience on earnings will also be biased downward. The goal of
our multinomial logit analyses is not to derive consistent estimates
of the effect of experience on either performance or salary. Rather,
they are intended to yield an answer to the question: Can the 40 or
so percent of the total earnings advantage enjoyed by more experi-
enced managers and professionals at the firms we have studied that
occurs within grade levels be explained by the fact that the more ex-
perienced employees within these grade levels are better performers?
Our answer of "no" does not depend on the consistency of either our
estimate of the impact of experience on performance or our estimate
of the impact of experience on earnings. All that the response depends
on is that the difference between these two estimated experience ef-
fects be a consistent estimate of the difference between the two "true"
experience effects. We know of no reason why it should not be.
It also seems unlikely that classical measurement error in our
performance variable should in any way affect the main conclusions
derivable from our multinomial logit models. In a linear model, error
in the dependent variable of the type under discussion will weaken
the equation's overall explanatory power but will not lead to incon-
sistent estimated coefficients. In the relevant multinomial logit
models, the performance ratings form the basis for the dependent
variables. We do not see how errors that arise out of random error in
the performance ratings would lead to inconsistency in the estimated
multinomial logit coefficients. Consistency is all that matters for our
purpose.
Use of Performance Ratings
The validity of our analysis depends on the assumption that
within a grade level, for the samples studied, performance ratings are
valid indicators of relative productivity. There is an extensive liter-
ature on white-collar performance evaluations.'6 Since critical articles
are more likely to find their way into personnel journals than those
that applaud current practices, performance evaluation programs
have been subject to a fair amount of criticism.
16. Foroodenera1 discussions and further references, see Barrett 11966], Bass
and Barrett [1972], Landy and Trumbo ]1976], and McCormick and Tiffin [19741.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 723
Much of this criticism focuses on the possibility that supervisors
may be overly lenient in rating their subordinates. While inflated
ratings are a matter of concern for personnel administrators, there
is no evidence to suggest that such inflation distorts the relative
rankings of employees by true performance. Even if the ratings of all
employees are biased upwards, the best employees should be rated
above average, and the worst employees below average. This is all that
matters for the present study.
A second criticism of performance ratings asserts that since
different supervisors may have divergent beliefs about what consti-
tutes good performance, ratings done by different supervisors should
not be compared. While it does seem unlikely that any two supervisors
would be completely consistent in their ratings, the results of labo-
ratory studies suggest that a high degree of interrater reliability can
be expected.17 In any event, so long as subordinates with particular
observed characteristics are not systematically paired with superiors
who rate more or less generously, our findings cannot be called into
question on account of variation in supervisors' rating standards.
A third potential weakness of performance ratings is that em-
ployees' personal characteristics (race, sex, age, time with company)
might influence supervisors' performance assessments. Whether race
or sex affects ratings is irrelevant in the context of the present study,
since we have restricted our analysis to samples of white males. Evi-
dence that supervisors systematically underrate the relative perfor-
mance of older or more senior workers would be very relevant. How-
ever, in our review of the pertinent literature, we have found no such
evidence.
One cannot conclude a priori that any systematic bias in per-
formance ratings associated with age or tenure should be in the di-
rection of understating rather than overstating older or more senior
workers' relative productivity. While one might argue that the typical
supervisor would tend to give a higher than deserved rating to an
employee in a given grade level with less than average experience
because of, say, lack of familiarity with his or her weaknesses or be-
cause of lower performance expectations, it seems equally plausible
to argue that the typical supervisor would favor an employee with
greater than average experience because of, say, friendship developed
over a period of years or because of lower expectations for someone
17. Relevant research includes Borman [1975] and Whitlock [1963]. Lawler [1967,
p.371] refers to Whitlock's work and asserts that 'other studies have shown that raters
tend to agree upon the weight to be assigned to. .. differentbehavior specimens; thus,
inter-rater reliability is possible." Unfortunately, he does not specify what other studies
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who is more likely to be a "stayer" as opposed to a "mover" in the
corporate hierarchy. (If the idea that a supervisor would implicitly
assume there to be a negative partial correlation between experience
and what one can expect from an employee seems implausible, the
reader should reassess its plausibility remembering that the relevant
partial correlation is with grade level held constant.) In fact, the
limited empirical evidence that is available on the issue of age- 'and
seniority-related bias in performance ratings suggests that more ex-
perienced employees tend to be rated somewhat higher than is war-
ranted by their true relative performance.'8 Thus, it appears that, so
long as older or more senior workers are not systematically below
superiors who underrate subordinates with these characteristics
(which we find most doubtful), unequal treatment in ratings is not
an acceptable explanation for more experienced workers in a grade
level receiving ratings that are no higher and perhaps somewhat lower
than those received by otherwise comparable less experienced
workers.
Another related possibility is that perhaps even within grade
levels at a company, more experienced workers might tend to be as-
signed more difficult tasks than less experienced workers (perhaps
because more is expected of those with more experience). If this were
the case, employees with greater than average experience could have
greater productivity than their less experienced peers and still receive
no higher or even lower performance ratings. However, since jobs are
grouped into grade levels on the basis of the importance and difficulty
of the tasks the job holder must perform, any difference in the po-
tential value of the tasks performed by employees in the same grade
level should be small. Further, the only evidence we have seen that
bears on this point suggests that older workers in a group of employees
holding similar jobs tend to be assigned less difficult rather than more
difficult tasks. In an article discussed at greater length in Section IV
of this study, Dalton and Thompson [1971] report that among engi-
neers at six companies there was a negative relationship between
supervisors' assessment of the complexity of the tasks a subordinate
was typically asked to perform and the subordinate's age. (Their
finding is illustrated graphically in Figure Tin Section IV.)
18. Two studies of blue collar workers, one by Rothe [1949] and one by Rundquist
and Bittner [1948], contain some evidence that the ratings of long service laundry
workers and of container inspectors tend to be inflated. A study by Ferguson [1949]
of ratings given to assistant life insurance sales managers and another study by
Stockford and Bissell [1949] of ratings given to first line supervisors at a manufacturing
plant suggest that superiors tend to be more lenient in rating those whom they have
known for a longer period of time.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 725
An analysis of promotion probabilities and percentage salary
increases in Company B can provide two tests of our contention that
performance ratings mirror relative true performance. These tests
are based on the seemingly reasonable assumptions that, holding
educational attainment, experience, and grade level constant, dif-
ferentials in promotion probabilities reflect differentials in produc-
tivity and that, holding the same variables plus ln(salary) constant,
differentials in percentage salary increases also reflect productivity
differentials.19 Under these assumptions, a strong positive association
between rated performance and probability of promotion or a strong
positive association between rated performance and percentage salary
increase among employees in the same grade level who have the same
amount of schooling and experience can be taken as evidence of a
strong association between relative performance rating and relative
productivity.
Table IV presents estimates of the effects of educational at-
tainment, experience, and rated performance on promotion proba-
bilities and percentage total salary changes.2° A maximum likelihood
logit procedure was used to estimate the promotion equations; ordi-
nary least squares was used to estimate the percentage salary change
equations.
The partial effect of rated performance in 1976 on the probability
that a Company B employee received a promotion between July 1,
1976, and July 1, 1977, is estimated in equation (1). The results imply
that individuals with either of the bottom two performance ratings
were substantially and significantly less likely to have been promoted
than otherwise comparable individuals with either of the top two
ratings. The equation (2) results support the same conclusion with
regard to the effect of rated performance as of July 1, 1974, on the
probability of having received a promotion between July 1, 1975, and
July 1, 1977.
19. Holding productivity constant, ln(salary) should be negatively related to
percentage salary increase if firms tend to increase the relative earnings of those who
are paid less and decrease the relative earnings of those who are paid more than they
are currently contributing. The assumptions made in the text also permit education,
experience, and grade level to have independent effects on probability of promotion
and percentage salary increase, although a priori it is not clear in which direction these
effects should go.
20. Estimates for Company A are not presented in Table IV because the Company
A file does not contain the necessary historical performance rating data. The Company
B samples consist of all white males who were "active" full-time regular domestically
based managerial and professional employees throughout the relevant periods, for
whom education, experience, and physical work location are known, for whom a valid
initial performance rating and grade level are available, and, when relevant, for whom
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Promotion-related salary increases are a relatively small part of
total salary increases at Company B. Between July 1, 1976, and July
1, 1977, only 9 percent of the total dollar amount of salary increases
granted were associated with promotions, while 83 percent were la-
beled "merit" increases. Regression (3) demonstrates a substantial
and significant positive partial correlation between 1976 relative
performance rating and 1976—1977 percentage total salary increase.
This result suggests that, while a part of so-called "merit" increases
is relatively automatic, part does in fact reflect merit. The fourth re-
gression shows that individuals with a given amount of schooling and
experience who received higher performance ratings in 1974 received
substantially and significantly higher average percentage salary in-
creases between July 1, 1975, and July 1, 1977, than did their lower
rated grade-level peers.
Critics of the use of performance ratings in the analysis presented
in Section II might make one further argument: since a major use of
ratings is to condition decision-making concerning promotions, rated
performance is likely to reflect not only a manager's or professional's
productivity in his current job but also his supervisor's assessment
of his potential for advancement within the company. Holding edu-
cation constant, more experienced (older) managers and professionals
are typically less likely to be promoted out of any given grade level
than less experienced (younger) managers and professionals and,
hence, apt to be perceived as having limited potential for future ad-
vancement.2' Thus, to the extent that performance ratings are af-
fected by supervisors' assessments of individuals' future potential,
more experienced workers might typically receive lower performance
ratings than warranted simply on the basis of their current
productivity.
The institutional basis for this argument is weak insofar as at
both Company A and Company B, the instructions to supervisors
preparing ratings clearly ask for an assessment of how well each em-
ployee is fulfilling the requirements of his or her current job, not for
a forecast of the employee's productivity profile over his or her work
life. At Company A supervisors are asked to make entries on a per-
21. Estimation of promotion equations similar to those in Table IV but without
performance rating controls yielded education and experience coefficients virtually
identical to those reported in Table IV. The coefficients from the equations without
rating controls imply that, for a Company B employee with the relevant sample mean
characteristics, an additional year of either pre-company experience or company service
was associated with a 6 percent lower chance of receiving a promotion between July
1, 1976, and July 1, 1977, and with a 5 percent lower chance of receiving a promotion
between July 1, 1975, and July 1, 1977.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 729
formance review worksheet "during the year for the purpose of pro-
viding supporting information for the annual employee assessment"
tour italics]; the intent is clearly that each employee's annual per-
formance rating should reflect his or her performance during the
appraisal year. At Company B, as seen above, the "Supervisor's Guide
for Performance Review and Development Planning" states that
"[r]eviews should be based on the employee's performance in his
present position and only for the period [typically one year] since his
last review" [our italics].22
Finally, it should be noted that at Company A, as at many U. S.
corporations, each employee's promotability is formally assessed
separately from his performance. A Company A supervisor who be-
lieved that a particular employee would do well in a higher level job
would not have to convey that information to higher management
indirectly by giving the employee a higher than deserved performance
rating but could convey his belief directly by awarding the employee
an appropriate promotability rating. Statistical results discussed in
Medoff and Abraham [forthcoming] based on data from another
U. S. manufacturing corporation indicate that the performance ratings
and the promotability measure used at that company really do capture
different things; while the performance ratings do very much better
in explaining current salary, the promotability measure strongly
dominates in predicting advancement to a higher grade level.23
In light of what we have been able to learn from our review of the
relevant personnel literature, from the case studies we have done, and
from various analyses with company personnel data, we feel very
comfortable in assuming that performance ratings are good indicators
of employees' relative productivity in the year of evaluation. Hence,
we believe that this diverse evidence strongly supports the interpre-
tation we have given to our results.
22. A small number of Company B supervisors were asked to "list the five most
important factors (in order of importance) that you consider when you give a perfor-
mance rating to a subordinate." Of the thirteen supervisors responding to this question,
only one indicated that he considered an employee's potential when awarding a per-
formance rating. For this supervisor, potential was the last factor listed, coming behind
"achievement against action plan," "creative element brought to assignments," "need
for supervision to complete assignments," and "attitude." All of the thirteen supervi-
sors' responses were consistent with a belief that the actual practices followed by
Company B raters closely matched the instructions they were given.
23. The Company A performance measure contributes more to explaining current
salary than does the Company A promotability measure. However, we were not able
to test whether at Company A the promotability measure dominated the performance
measure in predicting promotions because the Company A file did not contain the
historical performance rating and promotability rating information such a test would
have required.730 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
IV. TOWARD A RICHER EXPLANATION OF THE EXPERIENCE-
EARNINGS RELATIONSHIP
The finding that at least a substantial fraction of the experi-
ence-earnings differential cannot be explained by an experience-
performance differential among samples of white male managerial
and professional employees at Companies A and B does not appear
to be an aberration. We observed the same phenomenon in two
comparable studies, Medoff [1977] and Medoff and Abraham
[forthcoming], of a major airline and of another manufacturing firm.
Dalton and Thompson [19711 also obtained similar results in an
analysis (supported by the Harvard Business School) of the relative
performance and earnings of 2,500 managerial and professional em-
ployees of different ages in six technology-based companies. Figure
I is based on the information presented by Dalton and Thompson.
The average percentile performance ranking of employees in each age
group depicted in this figure is determined by supervisors' assess-
ments of the "contribution made to the company during the past year"
by their subordinates. Dalton and Thompson's findings imply that
although engineers older than thirty five received relatively low
performance ratings, they received relatively high earnings. In addi-
tion, the Dalton and Thompson results indicate a negative relation-
ship between relative performance and age among first and second
level managers after their late thirties.24 While information on the
managers' compensation was not presented, it would be most ex-
ceptional if there were a corresponding negative association between
relative earnings and age among those past their late thirties. In
comparing the relative salaries and performance of older and younger
engineers, Dalton and Thompson [p. 59] write:
While performance rankings begin to fall after the mid-thirties salaries continue to
climb until the early forties before leveling off. This increasing discrepancy between
a person's performance rankings and his "salary ranking" is one of the factors that
makes project leaders reluctant to have older engineers assigned to their projects.
The divergence between experience-earnings and experience-
performance differentials among managerial and professional em-
ployees in major U. S. firms raises a number of questions: (1) Why
might the relative performance of a managerial or professional em-
ployee stay constant or decrease over much of his or her worklife? (2)
What factors condition the salary determination process such that
24. For a summary of other studies concerning the relationship between experience
or age and performance that strongly support the main assertion of this study, see
Medoff and Abraham [April 1980].EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 731
Average Percentile Performance




Age, Performance, and Salary of Engineers; Age and Performance of Supervisors
and Managers; Age and Job Complexity of Engineers
(Adapted from Dalton and Thompson 11971])
within grade levels the experience-earnings differential cannot be
explained by an experience-performance differential? (3) While the
observed divergence between these two differentialsappears to be
inconsistent with a strictly human capital interpretation of theex-
perience-earnings profile, can the finding be reconciled with com-
petitive theory?
Why Might Relative Performance Not Increase with Experience?
Human capital theory argues that with thepassage of time
workers accumulate productivity-augmenting skills. Whileon-the-job
learning is undoubtedly of some importance, especially when aperson
is just beginning a job, other factors change over time ina direction
that implies a decrease in workers' capacity for their assignments.
Most importantly, during periods of rapid technological change, skills
workers acquired during the formal education processmay soon be-
come obsolete. Skill obsolescence creates the largest problems for
those in technical fields; for instance, revisions in collegeengineering
curricula since the 1950s have given increasing emphasis to basic
90% — Supervisors' and
Managers Performance
$18
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science and mathematics, which appears to have greatly reduced the
"half-life" of an engineering education.25 Similarly, the recent em-
phasis on quantitative techniques has most likely caused the business
training of many older managers to become substantially obsolete.
A second factor that can be expected to affect performance is the
stimulation (or lack of it) offered by an assignment. While learning
most likely occurs with doing (at least for a short period of time),
boredom is apt to set in eventually. Thus, the passage of time can come
to have a negative effect on productivity, mediated by what might be
called "on-the-job sensory deprivation."26
Motivation is a final potential determinant of within-grade-level
performance that is also, most likely, a function of time. Within a
grade level, workers with greater than average experience are rela-
tively behind their cohort in terms of movement up the corporate
hierarchy. Hence, within a grade level, workers with more experience
are likely to have a stronger feeling that they are not on their com-
pany's fast track or on any track at all and thus become discouraged.
This can lead to a reduction in effort expended on the job, especially
since companies appear to avoid discharges (at least among those who
are not new hires), demotions, and substantial cuts in relative salaries,
fear of which might give employees an incentive to avoid slackening
off. Dalton and Thompson [1971, p. 63] observed that the effort of the
engineers they studied seemed to decline with age and offered the
following explanation of the phenomenon:
An older engineer often views the future with pessimism. He expects little positive
reward, even if he does put forth greater effort.
Further, it has been claimed that older employees value promotions
less highly than do younger employees.27 This suggests that age can
be expected to reduce the effort employees expend in trying to
advance.
25. See Kaufman [1974].
26. For a discussion of the extensive literature on the importance of boredom in
industrial settings, see Maier [1973]. While most of the relevant studies have focused
primarily on production jobs, there is no reason why boredom should not have an effect
on those who remain in a given nonproduction assignment. Indeed, Kaufman [June
1974, p. 379] argues that, "Although the emphasis on such tecimiques as job enrichment
in recent years has focused mainly on nonprofessional employees, it is the professionals
in the organization who are likely to be most affected by the intrinsic motivation of
their work."
27. The issue of what rewards are most valued by different groups of employees
has received a great deal of attention from industrial psychologists. The study by Hall
and Mansfield [1975] lends support to the argument that older workers care less about
promotions than younger workers. Their paper also contains references to earlier studies
that reached similar conclusions.EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS 733
Thus, even if obsolescence and encroaching boredom were not
a problem for older workers in a job, motivational considerations could
explain why, within grade levels, relative performance might not in-
crease with experience. Next, we must address the more difficult
question of why within-grade-level earnings do increase with
experience.
Why Might Relative Earnings Increase with Experience Even If
Relative Productivity Does Not?
At this point in time, neither we nor, to the best of our knowledge,
anyone else can provide direct evidence in support of a new inter-
pretation of the experience-earnings relationship; our findings
demonstrate only that productivity-augmenting on-the-job training
should play a substantially smaller role in any new explanation than
it does under human capital theory. Moreover, since we feel that, to
be of value, any new interpretation must have an empirical basis, all
we wish to do at present is to suggest several alternatives whose va-
lidity must be assessed through the collection and analysis of addi-
tional information on the origins and functioning of firms' compen-
sation policies.
First, for any of a variety of reasons, employees and employers
may enter into implicit contracts that provide for relative earnings
growth unrelated to changes in relative productivity over the course
of a worker's tenure with the firm.28 One reason for both firms and
workers to prefer such a pay scheme is that deferring part of workers'
compensation may deter quitting or behavior that would lead to
discharge, increasing the expected present value of each employee's
net contribution to the firm and (assuming competition) increasing
the expected present value of each employee's lifetime compensa-
tion.29 Moreover, the regular receipt of raises may improve workers'
morale, which may in turn increase their productivity and present
value of lifetime compensation. Alternatively, steep wage profiles
might serve as a self-selection device. For example, workers with high
innate quit propensities might be less likely to come to work for a firm
that underpaid people at the start of their work lives and made up the
difference later on.30 A different rationale for implicit contracts
providing that at least some workers be paid less than they produce
28. For discussion of another type of implicit contract, see Baily 11974] and
Azariadis 119751.
29. One implicit contract model that offers a cheating deterrence story is devel-
oped in Lazear [1979].
30. See Salop and Salop [1976] for a formal development of this argument.734 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
when young and more than they produce when old might rest on
workers being risk-averse and owners of firms being risk-neutral. Not
knowing at the beginning of their work lives whether their produc-
tivity would grow rapidly or slowly, workers might want a pay scheme
that guaranteed annual pay increases of a certain amount independent
of whether they turned out to be high-productivity or low-productivity
employees. Still another possibility is that workers might prefer de-
ferred compensation if the rate of return on assets the firm can earn
exceeds the rate of return on assets accessible to the employee.
While all of the preceding seem at least on the surface to be
plausible hypotheses, so far as we know none has any empirical basis.
Furthermore, under implicit wage agreements of the sort discussed
above, the firm could increase current profits by violating its pledge
to pay long-service employees more than their productive value. Thus,
some enforcement mechanism must be introduced. One potential deus
ex machina is the firm's reputation (among present employees, future
employees, and the society at large), which is a determinant of its
long-run profitability. Whether or not such a mechanism exists is an
open question.3'
A second issue that merits consideration as a factor in the di-
vergence between the earnings and performance of senior employees
involves the relationship between a superior and subordinate. It is
likely that the disutility from firing or reducing the relative salary of
a long-time subordinate employee conditions a supervisor's decisions.
This is just an extension of the point that factors other than profits
are likely to enter the utility function of a manager.
A third issue which deserves mention is that workers have beliefs
concerning "just" relative compensation. These beliefs could stem
from certain societal values (e.g., "elders should be respected") and
could be quite strong. Thus, a compensation policy which pays each
employee his or her value of marginal product at each point in time
may not be the policy that would be chosen by the marginal or average
employee in the firm.
Each of these points is a member of a larger set that share the
realization that individuals are quite likely to prefer a compensation
policy which does not relate relative wages only to relative produc-
tivity. If any of the points is valid, long-run profit maximization need
not imply that when an employee's relative earnings are increasing,
the worker's relative performance could not be constant or decreasing.
Thus, it is not true that the divergence of experience-earnings and
31. For an empirical analysis of this issue, see Medoff and Abraham [April
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experience-performance profiles must be inconsistent with the tenets
of competitive theory. However, whether it is or is not remains to be
demonstrated.
V. CONCLUSION
This study has provided direct evidence concerning the rela-
tionship between experience and performance among managerial and
professional employees doing similar work at two major U. S. corpo-
rations. The facts presented indicate that while, within grade levels,
there is a strong positive association between experience and relative
earnings, there is either no association or a negative association be-
tween experience and relative performance. Since the fraction of the
experience-earnings relationship that occurs within grade levels is
substantial, at a minimum a substantial portion of this relationship
cannot be explained by the human capital model of productivity-
augmenting on-the-job training.
An explanation of why in U. S. corporations more experienced
workers doing a given job receive higher salaries than their less ex-
perienced, but no less productive, peers remains to be documented.
At present, there are a number of theories that have been offered as
consistent with our findings, but each of them suffers the same defi-
ciency as the human capital theory about the experience-earnings
profile: absence of an empirical basis. Nevertheless, we are confident
that through future explorations within firms guided by those who
administer and those who are affected by corporate compensation
policies, the requisite evidence can be obtained. This will represent
an important step toward an empirically based interpretation of ex-
perience-earnings differentials in particular and earnings differentials
in general.
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